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ABSTRACT 
 
A clinical workflow considers the information and processes that are involved in 
providing a clinical service. They are safety critical since even minor faults have 
the potential to propagate and consequently cause harm to a patient, or even for 
a patient's life to be lost. Experiencing these kinds of failures has a destructive 
impact on all the involved parties. 
 
Due to the large number of processes and tasks included in the delivery of a clinical 
service, it can be difficult to determine the individuals or the processes that are 
responsible for adverse events, since such an analysis is typically complex and slow 
to do manually. Using automated tools to carry out an analysis can help in 
determining the root causes of potential adverse events and consequently help in 
avoiding preventable errors through either the alteration of existing workflows, or 
the design of a new workflow. 
 
This paper describes a technical approach to safety analysis of clinical workflows, 
utilising a safety analysis tool (Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS)) that is already in use in the field of mechanical 
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systems. The paper then demonstrates the applicability of the approach to clinical 
workflows by applying it to analyse the workflow in a radiology department. 
 
We conclude that the approach is applicable to this area of healthcare and provides 
a mechanism both for the systematic identification of adverse events and for the 
introduction of possible safeguards in clinical workflows. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing use of information systems in delivering clinical processes brings 
about substantial benefits to healthcare industry. At the same time, these 
innovations require changes to established processes and can create complex 
workflows which have the potential to affect patient safety by causing unintended 
faults within clinical services, which can be harmful to individuals and may affect 
the reputation of healthcare organizations. Therefore, in order to reduce this risk 
and to achieve benefits from the involvement of advanced applications and 
processes, attention should be given to the design and the safety of clinical 
workflows. A workflow defines the activities planned to accomplish a process, the 
order of invocation of activities, the conditions under which such activities must be 
invoked, and the synchronization and information flow (dataflow) between 
activities (Belhajjame et al., 2001). Business process re-engineering used the term 
workflow to refer to the processes involved in arriving at a given objective which 
can be completed only through certain steps, and handled by more than one person 
(Ouvry, 2002). So, workflow can be understood as the description of a process 
model, and management of automated and manual tasks of business rules (Fischer, 
2001).  
Healthcare processes have both medical and non-medical activities which can be 
considered within a particular workflow; both types include potentially high-risk 
activities and failure in any part may lead to catastrophic consequences (Ruffolo et 
al., 2007). In other words, a healthcare workflow includes medical and 
administrative activities that are executed to produce a clinical service; deviations 
in these activities have the potential to deliver a faulty service. 
Referring to the previous definitions, we define the term “clinical workflow” to 
describe the tasks that are performed carefully by more than one participant to 
accomplish a clinical process (e.g. treatment or diagnosis) and to produce a certain 
clinical output.   
It has been widely reported that different healthcare errors, including those in 
medical treatment processes and workflows, are significant cause of death and 
suffering (e.g. see (Starfield, 2000)  and (Green, 2013)). As patient safety has come 
to be an international priority (Battles and Lilford, 2003), finding effective methods 
to reduce medical errors and their contribution to adverse events is required (Murff 
et al., 2003).  
In clinical workflows, we may face the problem of having errors in the developed 
workflow (which is supposed to be followed by the involved parties) that may 
propagate to cause failures and output deviations. We can avoid having such kind 
of errors by applying a formal systematic method for the development and the safety 
analysis of the workflow. Human failures are also expected in any large process, so 
a system is susceptible to this hazard if there is no technological remedy (Reason, 
1990). In this research, human errors are to be considered through the workflow 
safety analysis because this analysis focuses on the errors and faults in the 
workflows which happen during executing the steps of the workflow and leads to 
workflow failures. 
Due to the large number of parties typically involved in the delivery of clinical 
service, it can be difficult to determine the individuals or the processes which are 
responsible for the adverse events. Using technological tools to do so can help in 
determining the root causes of the potential adverse events. This enables the 
redesign of the processes and tasks which are accountable for such events, and 
consequently improves the reliability of the workflow through designing more 
reliable and non-faulty workflows. The analysis results can help as well to improve 
training of medical staff.  
During the workflow development and safety analysis, all possible failure modes 
should be considered. Safe operation of a workflow in action is not guaranteed 
unless the theoretical developed workflow is carefully checked for safety and 
followed exactingly by the involved agents. Currently used methodologies, such as 
manual Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
rely on the ability of the safety engineer to understand and to predict the workflow 
behaviour. So, they themselves are difficult to validate for human error.  
Automation of these methods can help when dealing with more complex 
workflows. 
This paper presents a systematic technical approach to safety analysis of clinical 
workflows. The focus of the approach is on the integration between the architectural 
design of the systems and applications (that are part of the workflow), the dataflow 
within the involved systems, and the system environment: in other words, the 
interactions between the different parties involved in the clinical workflow. These 
may include the physicians, radiologists, nurses, patients, and the system 
environment, and all must be modelled and analysed in combination with the 
hardware and software components. 
Modelling these interactions and focusing on the relations and the communication 
between all agents for the purpose of the safety analysis can both achieve a more 
holistic analysis and provide an efficient way to identify preventable errors and 
solutions for potential failures, and therefore helps in redesigning the workflow to 
achieve best safety results and accordingly to provide safe healthcare practices.  
We will demonstrate the development and safety analysis of a workflow as a 
structured approach through which safety analysis tools are used to reduce risk over 
the workflow. In other words, the approach should increase the reliability of 
workflows through the safety analysis. We define a workflow as safe once it can be 
executed without failures, if the detailed steps in the workflow are executed 
correctly. It is crucial that comprehensive approaches be developed so that different 
components and properties of the clinical workflow can be analysed. The analysis 
of a clinical workflow.  
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present our proposed 
approach, where the requirement gathering and workflow modelling are discussed. 
A technique called Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
studies (HiP-HOPS) is used to automate the FTA and FMEA of the workflow. 
Probability analysis is optional, and the new workflow design and accreditation is 
also presented. In section four, we illustrate the approach through an example of an 
analysis of a workflow in a radiology department. Finally, we draw our conclusions 
and discuss related work.  
 
2. An Approach for Safety Analysis of Clinical Workflows 
The focus of the workflow safety analysis must be on analysing the safety 
requirements in the presence of component failures (components here are hardware, 
software, humans, processes and tasks). The use of Model Based Safety Analysis 
(MBSA) is recommended, where models for the workflow are developed and 
repeated analysis and redevelopment on the model is performed until an 
accreditable workflow design is achieved. The model can be developed by the 
safety engineer in cooperation with a group of healthcare experts. After the model 
is developed the modelling notation itself must be annotated with the fault 
behaviour. A graphical language such as Simulink can be used for modelling.  
The proposed approach aims is designed to support the development and safety 
analysis of clinical workflows. The following daAiagram illustrates the approach: 
Figure 1 The Approach 
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 The following sections explains the approach in more detail. 
 
2.1  Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-
HOPS) 
 
Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) 
(Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999) is a state of the art technique for identifying 
week points in systems design in an efficient manner. It allows semi-automation 
and integration of two important classical methods: FTA and FMEA.  
FTA is a deductive method which describes how different components failures (or 
events) or their combinations can cause an unwanted event (often termed the top 
event). Quantitative analysis of the FTA can be implemented to calculate the 
probability of the top event and qualitative analysis is performed to identify the 
necessary and sufficient combinations of events which caused the top event (termed 
Minimal Cut Sets or 'MCS') (Vesely et al., 1981). FMEA is an inductive technique 
which inspects the effect of component failures towards system failures. 
System models can be annotated with HiP-HOPS failure behaviour using a number 
of modelling packages (e.g. Matlab Simulink). These models are then analysed and 
FTA and FMEA results are produced. 
Al-Qora'n et al. (2013) used HiP-HOPS to analyse the safety of the dataflow of a 
home Telemonitoring system. This current paper utilises HiP-HOPS to develop an 
approach for safety analysis of clinical workflows. The approach considers the 
differences between healthcare and other industries as well as the differences 
between mechanical systems and clinical workflows. 
 
2.2 Phases of the workflow safety process 
 
2.2.1 Requirements Generation 
The first step in the safety analysis process is done by a safety engineer/analyst in 
the healthcare organization in cooperation with a team of healthcare experts. The 
safety engineer/analyst is responsible for collecting sufficient detailed data to model 
the workflow and its critical parts. In-depth data includes the involved parties, 
hardware and software components, processes and tasks involved in the workflow. 
The approach suggests that the safety engineer must collect the data about a new 
workflow from scratch instead of using any existing models for the purpose of the 
analysis. However, the approach proposes the use of  previously analysed 
components in this phase and in the modelling; the decision to do this is done 
through this phase when the healthcare experts specify that the workflow could be 
connected with another workflow or parts of another workflow in the hospital. An 
individual workflow component can be a task, a process, a software agent, human 
agent, hardware, or a workflow that encapsulates a set of related tasks or processes. 
2.2.2 Workflow Modelling 
After amassing comprehensive data about the workflow, the available documented 
data needs to be organised and structured. The functional/ architectural model needs 
to be built, and it should show the basic topology of the workflow and the 
interconnections between various components and subcomponents. All workflow 
processes are placed into separate components so that all of the tasks and different 
agents inside each component are semantically related; that is why we can say that 
the components are integrated and interconnected.  
2.2.3 Hazards Identification 
After building the model the possible ways the overall workflow can fail are to be 
determined. This is the responsibility of the safety engineer and the healthcare 
experts. They determine the possible faults in each component separately to provide 
sufficient data for the failure annotation. 
2.2.4 Failure Annotation 
After preparing the model, and specifying the failure behaviour for each of the 
component in the model, the process of annotating the model with the failure 
behaviour starts. The HiP-HOPS tool needs to know how the various components 
of the system are interconnected and how each can fail. In this phase components 
are annotated with a set of the failure expressions showing how deviations in each 
component output can be caused by either internal failure of this component or 
corresponding deviations in its input. In other words, the failure information defines 
how failure in the component output can be caused by the propagation of failure to 
the component input or the internal malfunction of the component itself.  
So, each component (which could be a process, task, user, application, or hardware) 
needs to be annotated with its own failure data which describes what could go 
wrong with the component and how it responds to failures elsewhere in the system. 
For example, for an application component this data might include unexpected 
omission or unintended commission of the output. 
2.2.5 Fault Tree and FMEA Synthesis and Analysis  
After the model is annotated, HiP-HOPS is applied and automatically navigates 
through the failure information backwards, starting from the workflow failure and 
connecting each failure to its causes, linking them with logical operators. This 
results in the automated production of the main fault tree which can then be 
analysed. HiP-HOPS synthesises and analyses the workflow fault tree and produces 
the FTA and FMEA results which show how the value failure in components can 
lead to the workflow failure. During this phase, the MCSs that are required to cause 
the top event are obtained as well.  
This qualitative analysis data are then used by the analyst to redesign the workflow. 
In some cases this qualitative data is enough to refine and reengineer the processes 
and tasks within the workflow. Therefore, the analyst can start to redesign the 
workflow immediately after the qualitative analysis. However, in some cases the 
new design may require replacements of the existing components with components 
which are costly for the healthcare organisation, and thus the healthcare providers 
may ask for quantitative information about the likelihood of the component to fail. 
In these cases, quantitative analysis is recommended, otherwise, the analyst can 
move immediately to the new workflow design phase. 
2.2.6 Probability Analysis  
Probability analysis is an optional step which can be carried out within the previous 
phases. This could be performed by obtaining the failure information of different 
components and adding numerical information into the components in the 
modelling phase, where HiP-HOPS provides information about the unavailability 
of each top event.  
Workflow components could be processes, tasks, or people. Therefore, it is 
different from other components that have manufacturer failure rate. Human error 
failure rates can be acquired using quantitative analysis methods of real data to get 
statistical information from previous experiences. However, this method has the 
problem that the analysis results may reflect incorrect results due to the vagueness 
of the data provided. The reason behind this inaccuracy is that human failures are 
dynamic as they may be affected by many environmental factors.  This was the 
motivation behind searching for another mechanism for the probability analysis 
which handles the uncertainty issue. Therefore, probability of the human error 
usually cannot be given an exact value, and instead would be estimated.  
The proposed probability analysis in this approach is a single phase and is separated 
from the analysis phase. After finishing the analysis phase and getting the FTA and 
FMEA results, the analyst can start the quantitative analysis if it is required by 
getting an estimated probability for each of the fault tree components. In this case, 
analysts can seek experts’ opinion and can develop their own tools to get such 
failure numeric information. After that, fuzzy set theory is used to quantify the fault 
trees. 
This failure probability analysis approach has the potential to affect the results and 
the accuracy of the analysis. In other words, it specifies the failure rates that are 
used for the analysis and consequently has a direct effect on the analysis results.  
2.2.7 New Workflow Design 
After completing the analysis using HiP-HOPS and getting the qualitative data, the 
workflow needs to be redesigned and the workflow components, which have faults 
that might cause the failures, need to be replaced with components that are more 
reliable. As explained previously, if this replacement is costly for the hospital or the 
healthcare institution, they might require probability analysis for the workflow, as 
they want to see some statistics about the probability of those causes to make an 
informed decision about the cost of replacement.  In other words, this is a part of 
the cost benefit analysis, where the cost of replacement is compared to its benefits 
and the severity of the failure. 
If the probability analysis is required, it must be accomplished before the workflow 
redesign; if it is not required, workflow redesign is accomplished immediately after 
the qualitative analysis. After that, it needs to be tested if it meets the safety 
requirements or not; if yes, the safety engineer can go ahead and the workflow is 
accredited and approved as the formal workflow in the department. Conversely, if 
it not does meet the requirements, then the process needs to be repeated until the 
workflow is satisfactory. 
When the safety engineer develops the workflow, the healthcare providers who are 
involved in the workflow and the various involved parties must be notified and 
safety training provided for them. This helps to ensure that they are aware of the 
causes and consequences of any potential errors within the workflow. The analysis 
results must be summarised as formal guidelines in a medical language instead of 
formal technical language. Every employee should have an understanding of how 
these results might show that certain failures are his/her responsibility. 
2.2.8 Accreditation of the Workflow 
Once the workflow is analysed and redesigned, and before the workflow can be 
accredited as the formal workflow within a department or a hospital, the safety 
engineer must make a thorough check to make sure that all the significant risks and 
hazards are addressed. Moreover, he should make sure that the remaining risk is 
acceptable and he should focus the attention of the users to this risk. Solutions for 
the possible failures must be effective. For example, a root cause for the failure 
which could be a certain task must be marked as it should be executed in a strict 
way. 
One more important issue to keep in mind, when planning to adopt new systems or 
to make changes on the organisational procedures level, is that these changes must 
be reflected in the workflow itself. This should be done because these changes have 
the potential to introduce new hazards. 
Using this approach has the potential to reveal patterns of diagnostic and procedural 
failures that suggest areas for improvement. Systematic analysis of such failures 
and pinpointing their root causes can identify potential preventive strategies which 
can help in promoting the safety culture in healthcare organisations.  
To conclude, the workflow delivering a clinical service must specify the tasks and 
processes to be completed as well as the people who are responsible to accomplish 
them in a particular order. Understanding this workflow is very important in order 
to maximize the efficiency and to prevent errors. A clear definition of the workflow 
can help in identifying its critical parts and in improving the flow of information 
and work within the healthcare organization. The involved parties must be involved 
in the development process of the workflow and they should have access to the final 
workflow and its information. They must be trained so that safety becomes an 
essential part of their work. 
3. Case Study: Radiology Department Workflow 
This section describes the application of the approach to a workflow within a 
radiology department. Whilst this is only a single example, we believe that the 
approach is applicable to many other clinical workflows. 
In our project we accomplished an empirical study in a radiology department in a 
hospital in Jordan. We applied our approach to build and analyse the workflow 
within the department. The following subsections describe the steps: 
3.1 Requirements Generation 
Initially, we documented the workflow within the radiology department and 
identified its components and the interactions between them. Critical workflow 
components were also determined. These are the components which potentially 
experience faults and errors as well as failures that are likely to happen if the 
component is compromised by the error. Data is collected from and discussed with 
a healthcare team in the department regarding the occurrence of workflow errors 
and their prevention in the same scenario environment. The result was a 
documentation of the involved components, their failure behaviour, and the 
interactions between them.  
The following describes part of the details which are required to analyse one failure 
scenario: 
The workflow starts with the Hospital Information System (HIS). The data is stored 
in the Electronic Health Record (EHR) which is a subcomponent of the HIS. The 
clinician is responsible for sending the data to the Radiology Information System 
(RIS), which acts with the Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS) 
as an individual departmental radiology system. The information to be entered 
includes the following: Patient name, Patient National Number (ID), Date of Birth 
(DoB), Age, Address, Patient medical Information, and Order Information. Later 
scheduling information can be added into the RIS by a radiologist or a nurse. 
Next, the RIS output goes directly to the Modality Worklist (MWL) which acts as 
a database in which the orders are scheduled to be sent automatically to the image 
acquisition modality. This database is exposed to hardware and software errors. At 
the image acquisition modality the patient is supposed to have an examination that 
is specified in the order.  The output of the image acquisition modality is the patient 
id, patient name and the image itself. This output is transferred automatically to the 
PACS. 
When PACS receives this output information it archives them and sends them to 
the diagnostic workstation to be seen by the radiologist. The radiologist interprets 
the examination and produces a report as an output. This report is then passed to 
the clinician to make the diagnoses and to deliver the treatment.  
3.2 Workflow Modelling 
The following figure shows the model which we developed to represent the 
workflow within the department:   
Figure 2 Radiology Workflow 
We built our model using Matlab Simulink which has an interface to HiPHOPS. 
The workflow components include health information systems, human agents, 
hardware components, tasks and processes.  
3.3 Hazards Identification 
The potential errors at component level were specified in cooperation with the 
healthcare team. Possible failures and internal malfunctions were discussed and 
identified.  
3.4 Failure Annotation  
Here, we extended the model with failure information. This information describes 
how a failure in the component output is caused by a propagation of failure from 
the component input or the internal malfunction of the component itself. Failure is 
represented in the format of “FailureType-ComponentName.ComponentPort” in 
HiP-HOPS. 
We analysed the scenario on providing the wrong treatment to the patient. As 
described by the workflow architecture, the treatment is considered as a separate 
component, the value failure of the output is represented as V-Out1. For simplicity, 
in presenting our results we referred to the value failure of the output as “wrong 
treatment”. 
The patient’s ID and DOB are entered into the HIS together with other information. 
Incorrect data entry may cause a value failure of ID and DoB which we denoted as 
V-ID_out, and V-DoB_out. Also omission of the DoB which is denoted as O-DoB 
causes problems and it is classified here as output deviation of the HIS. Moreover, 
HIS internal malfunctions can cause the output failures of the HIS; these are 
represented as HWError, SWError, and DataEntryError. 
Similarly, the clinician — who is included in the workflow as a separate component 
— can have output deviations. The clinician might make data entry errors which 
are represented here as IDDataEntryError or DoBDataEntryError. The output 
deviations are represented as V-PatientID_out and V-DoB_out. 
RIS internal malfunctions may include software or hardware malfunction, 
represented as HWError, SWError. RIS as well may receive wrong ID and wrong 
DoB from the Clinician, represented as IDDataEntryError and DoBDataEntryError. 
Therefore, output deviations at RIS could be having the wrong ID, omission of 
DoB, or having the wrong DoB; these are represented respectively as: V-ID_out, 
O-DoB_out, V-DoB_out. 
MWL can have two basic events, which are software error or hardware error. These 
are represented as SWError and HWError respectively. Each of the 
ModalityWorklist inputs has its own failure but in the first scenario, some failures 
have been considered and the others are ignored as they are assumed to be free from 
failures. The failures which are to be analysed are: the failure of the value of the ID, 
and the value failure of the DoB either as a value failure or omission of this value. 
These are represented as V-ID_out, V-DoB_out. 
When it comes to the image acquisition modality, at the time of the test the 
radiologist should verify certain information with the patient, e.g. ID, DoB, name, 
and the site of the image (e.g. right/left). The process of verbal verification is 
represented as a separate component which may have three basic events which are 
human errors; we represented them as: IDHumanError, DoBHumanError and 
SiteHumanError. Failures of the output of this component are represented as: O-
IDVer, O-DOBVer and O-SiteVer. Basic events for the image acquisition modality 
are represented as ImageUnmarked, and ImageMislabled. These basic events 
happen when the image is mislabelled with the wrong patient or the wrong data, 
such as having the image for the right lung instead of the left one. The other case 
may happen when the image has the right information but it is unmarked for the 
purpose of specifying the site, and therefore the radiologist produce the wrong 
report. 
The output deviations of the PACS component were represented as V-Patient_out 
and V-Image_out. The diagnostic workstations component has the HumanError as 
a basic event, and has a number of output deviations: V-Report, V-Site, and V-
PatientID.  
The treatment procedure may have an output deviation as well, and this is 
represented as V-Out1, which might be caused by V-In1 OR ProcedureTool OR 
ClinicalInput.  
3.5 Fault Tree and FMEA Synthesis and Analysis 
The components of the model were annotated with the corresponding failure 
information and then we performed the root cause analysis. HiP-HOPS synthesises 
and analyses the system fault trees and produces the FTA and FMEA results, which 
show how the value failure in an input and the component failures (or their 
combinations) can lead to the failure in causing the wrong treatment of  the patient.  
The following figure shows the FTA: 
                             Figure 3 FTA 
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The following list shows the MCS from the FTA: 
Figure 4 MCS 
 
The MCS is a smallest — i.e., necessary and sufficient — combination of primary 
events causing the top event. All of the basic events in the set need to occur to cause 
the top event. It directly links the top event to the primary events, and the complete 
set of the MCS provides the complete set of causes of the top event. 
The following table shows the resulting FMEA table of the direct effects: 
Table 1 FMEA of the direct effects 
 
The following table shows the resulting FMEA table of the further effects: 
Table 2 FMEA of further effects 
 
To summarise, the FTA and FMEA results show that the following faults may lead 
to the failure of the first scenario (which is in this case giving the wrong treatment 
to the patient):  
 Human error at the diagnostic workstation, either by making an error in 
reading the image or the wrong specification of the site. The wrong 
specification of the site is usually a human error at the scheduling, at the 
order information level or a human error in the diagnostic workstation itself; 
 The use of the inappropriate procedure tools; 
 Incorrect clinical input for the procedure; 
 Data entry error for the ID by a clinician, combined with an error in the 
verbal verification of the ID by the radiologist at the time of the imaging. 
This combination of errors may lead to the wrong treatment because of 
producing a report for the wrong patient; 
 Data entry error for the ID in the RIS combined with an error in the verbal 
verification of the ID by the radiologist at the time of the imaging. Data 
entry error for the ID in the HIS combined with an error in the verbal 
verification of the ID by the radiologist at the time of imaging; 
 Clinician order information error combined with the site verbal verification; 
 Image unmarked at the image acquisition modality combined with site 
verification error; 
 Image mislabelled with the wrong study combined with site verification 
error. 
This means if there is any error in the data entry in HIS, clinician, and the RIS, 
combined with a situation where the radiologist does not verify (or verifies 
incorrectly) the data for ID or site information, the wrong treatment towards the 
patient will occur. We can prevent such errors through highlighting the critical tasks 
in the workflow and adding extra functionality, for example using bar coded 
patients and marking of sites.  
3.6 Probability Analysis 
As our qualitative analysis results did not show a need for a costly replacement of 
the existing components, probabilistic analysis was not necessary. So, we directly 
verified the workflow with the healthcare team to declare the formal workflow.   
3.7 New Workflow Design and Accreditation of the Workflow 
In our case the workflow which we built was sufficient as the healthcare team 
verified it and they were satisfied with the results. The approach suggests areas to 
improve those tasks which can cause failures. As the workflow will be available to 
the people involved in it, as part of building awareness, they should be made aware 
of the critical tasks and the potential failures they can cause so that they are able to 
accomplish them properly and safely. 
4. Conclusion 
It is concluded that the approach is applicable to this area of healthcare and provides 
benefits through a combination of detailed information on possible risks and 
descriptive safety analysis based on experts’ opinion. This provides a mechanism 
for the systematic identification of both adverse events and possible safeguards in 
clinical workflows, which is important in terms of identifying the causes of possible 
adverse events before they happen and therefore helping to prevent harm to the 
patient. Moreover, the approach helps in the clear definition of the workflow 
including its processes and tasks, which provides a valuable opportunity for 
formulation of safety improvement strategies.  
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